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Research on central bank capital and credibility evolved from the interests of developing 
countries to those of developed countries after the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. 
There is growing concern about central bank balance sheets at exit from quantitative 
easing. This paper surveys the literature in such a context. It starts by citing early literature 
which suggests that a central bank with insufficient capital may be pressured to pursue an 
inflationary policy at a time of crisis that jeopardizes its credibility. A theoretical analysis 
of this problem is carried out by the use of the central bank budget constraints and its 
intertemporal variant, leading to discussions on the solvency of the central bank. Several 
central banks make fiscal transfers to the government, and their solvency situation is 
influenced by whether a central bank has fiscal transfers to and from the government. 
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The intent of this paper is to review the literature on capital and credibility of the central 
bank. Over the last decade, central banks in major countries have been adopting 
aggressive unconventional monetary policies, and concerns about their balance sheets 
have been rising. This paper discusses the literature in the same setting. 
 If a central bank is faced with a substantial loss due to a negative financial shock, its 
capital decreases or may even become negative, which is said to jeopardize the bank’s 
credibility. The question then has to be addressed as to why a central bank needs sufficient 
capital and how insufficient capital is harmful to the bank’s reputation. 
 A number of recent research papers on this topic have concentrated on developing 
countries, as some of these countries have experience of central bank failure due to 
foreign-exchange or banking-sector crises. For example, Leone (1994) studied the losses 
of central banks by analyzing 14 Latin American countries. 
 Central banks in developed countries have not been considered to be facing such a 
problem. However, a number of them have begun an aggressive unconventional monetary 
policy, which has put them at risk of having to face substantial losses as they exit the 
policy. The first central bank to introduce an unconventional monetary policy was the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) in 1999. In their studies, Ueda (2004) and Cargill (2005, 2006) 
addressed the balance sheet of the BOJ which was affected by the policy. 
 In 2008, “Lehman Shock” struck global financial markets. The central banks in 
developed countries, such as the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), introduced an unconventional policy. In the 2010s, further papers about central 
bank balance sheets in developed countries were beginning to get published. 
 The studies cited in this paper have various motivations, but are arranged here to 
support the context of central bank capital and credibility. Section 2 reviews the early 
literature concerning central bank capital. Without sufficient capital, a central bank cannot 
implement an appropriate monetary policy, and that puts its credibility at risk. Empirical 
studies focusing on capital and policy performance are also summarized in this section. 
Section 3 deals with the development of a theoretical framework for the instant study. 
Initially, the central bank budget constraints that create adjustments in the bank balance 
sheet are addressed, and then its intertemporal version which leads to discussions on 
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solvency is presented. Several studies on bank behavior to prevent insolvency were also 
studied. Section 4 reviews the literature on fiscal transfers to and from the government. 
 
2. Capital and Monetary Policy 
2.1. Need for Capital 
Central banks are usually in good financial health. Their monopolistic power of issuing 
money brings them an immense amount of seigniorage. Nevertheless, some central banks 
are forced to bear substantial losses due to quasi-fiscal practices, including acquisition of 
government’s foreign debt or the assets of distressed financial institutions at unfavorable 
rates1. When these losses are significantly high, the capital of the central bank would 
reduce or even become negative. 
 Since the introduction of unconventional monetary easing, there has been growing 
concern in developed countries regarding central bank capital. If a central bank 
implements a credit easing, its risky assets can cause losses at any time. A much larger 
loss may occur on exiting quantitative easing (QE) and after it as well. Let Table 1(a) be 
an expanded balance sheet of the central bank by QE. The bank had acquired a large 
number of assets, mainly long-term government bonds, to supply the monetary base. 
When exiting the QE, the bank must dramatically reduce its monetary base. One such 
strategy is to sell some of the assets. At the exit, however, a rise in the overall interest rate 
immediately results in a bank bearing an immense realized capital loss because of lower 
selling prices. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here. 
 
 Bernanke (2009) proposed an alternative exit strategy. It was to absorb the excessive 
monetary base by offering liabilities with interest rates that were high enough to 
discourage private banks from using them. Table 1(b) displays the balance sheet while 
this technique is used by the central bank. Unlike the asset-selling strategy, the bank will 
not automatically incur a significant loss at exit. However, it continues to bear the 
responsibility of paying a substantial sum of interest, which gradually erodes the capital 
 
1See Leone (1994), p. 745 for more examples of losses. 
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of the bank. 
 Stella (1997) discussed in depth why central banks are in need of capital. Whether it 
is a central bank or a private bank, negative capital does not automatically cause the bank 
to fail. It runs for as long as it has liquidity. If it is a private bank, negative capital plunges 
the bank into a lack of liquidity, which causes the bank to fail. If it is a central bank, the 
bank will never be short of liquidity because it can generate liquidity by issuing money. 
However, issuing money means unintended monetary easing. If the bank continues to 
produce losses, then continuing to issue money would only accelerate inflation. The 
central bank cannot therefore implement an appropriate monetary policy, which damages 
its credibility. 
 As Dalton and Dziobek (2005) looked at some of the past setbacks, a central bank 
suffers from a significant capital reduction when it is struggling with any economic crisis. 
Ize (2005) developed a quantitative framework for central bank accounting and explored 
the capital and credibility of some troubled central banks by applying the framework to 
their cases. Ize (2007) also used the framework to explore numerous central banks 
including financially sound ones. 
 When vulnerable to losses, the central bank will continue to generate losses as a 
result of significant loss during a crisis that accelerates inflation. Stella (2003, 2005) 
argued that the central bank has to have “financial strength” to prevent such a situation. 
 
2.2. Evidence of Policy Performance 
In order to find proof of a negative relationship between the financial strength of a central 
bank and inflation, it is necessary to have data on its financial strength. A simple approach 
is to use the ratio of capital to total assets. However, as central bank accounting varies 
across countries and changes over time, it is difficult to provide a consistent collection of 
data. 
 For adjustment, Stella (2008, pp. 15-17) proposed adding “Other Items Net (OIN)” 
to the capital of the central bank in the International Financial Statistics. OIN is the “not 
explicitly identified” net liability, and Stella (2008) argued that capital is less than it 
appears to be if a central bank has a negative OIN. He calculated the ratio of capital plus 
OIN to total assets and compared the countries with a negative ratio to those with a 
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positive ratio. He found that the former countries had a higher rate of inflation. 
 Klüh and Stella (2008) have probably carried out the first econometric analysis on 
this topic. They regressed inflation on the ratio of capital plus OIN to total assets as well 
as other variables. Similar analyses were also carried out by Benecká et al. (2012) and 
Perera et al. (2013). However, Adler et al. (2012) have followed a rather different 
approach. They investigated whether a reduced financial strength would limit the conduct 
of monetary policy. They used the deviation of the realized interest rate from the estimated 
optimal level as a measure of monetary policy constraints and regressed it on the capital 
plus OIN ratio. 
 They all found strong evidence of a negative relationship between financial strength 
and inflationary policy, with the exception of Benecká et al. (2012), whose findings 
showed a lack of robustness, and indicated that a decreasing or negative capital would 
jeopardize the credibility of the central bank 2 . All of them have also established 
differences between developing countries or those with higher inflation and developed or 
those with lower inflation. The negative relationship was found to be stronger in the 
former countries, and it was non-linear.  
 
3. Solvency 
3.1. Budget Constraints 
To explore how a reduced financial strength causes higher inflation, it is necessary to 
examine a central bank budget constraint. For this purpose, consider the case in Table 
1(b): exiting QE with high interest-bearing liabilities.  
 A central bank exits QE at t=0, and it decreases the monetary base from 𝐻−1 to 𝐻0 
by 𝐿0 = 𝐻−1 − 𝐻0, where 𝐻𝑡 and 𝐿𝑡 are the monetary base and high interest-bearing 
liabilities at t, respectively. The bank profit 𝜋𝑡 at t is 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑡 − 𝐶, (1) 
where 𝐴 is the asset holdings accumulated during the QE. Because a central bank cannot 
change its asset holdings easily in Table 1(b), 𝐴 is assumed to be constant for simplicity 
in this paper. 𝑟𝐴 and 𝑟𝐿 are the interest rates on 𝐴 and 𝐿𝑡 respectively, while 𝐶 is the 
 
2Hampl et al. (2018) deny the negative relationship. They check the precedent literature 
and claim that there is a publication bias. 
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bank’s operating cost.  
 This section assumes that there is no fiscal transfer to or from the government, which 
is discussed in section 4, so all the profit is added to the bank capital 𝐾 in the next period. 
∆𝐾𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡−1 = 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 − 𝐶, (2) 
where ∆ denotes a change from the previous period to the present. 𝐴 denotes the long-
term bonds accumulated during the low interest rate period of QE, while 𝐿𝑡 is used for 
short-term liabilities acquired when the interest rates were rising at the time of exit and 
after it as well. Therefore, 𝑟𝐿 is much higher than 𝑟𝐴, which may cause 𝜋 to become 
negative, and 𝐾 to shrink. 
 The budget constraint at each t is  
𝐴 − 𝐻𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐻𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑡−1, 
and it becomes, 
∆𝐿𝑡 = −∆𝐻𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡−1 = −∆𝐻𝑡 − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝐶. (3) 
If the central bank suppresses an increase in 𝐻𝑡 , it will expand 𝐿𝑡 . This causes an 
increase in 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑡, which is the interest burden at t+1, only to accelerate the expansion in 
𝐿, causing even more burden of interest in future. To avoid this, the central bank needs to 
accelerate the expansion in 𝐻, causing higher inflation in future. 
 This tradeoff between increased burden of interest and higher inflation is eased if 
𝐾0, the capital at the exit, is large. Given 𝐻0 and 𝐿0, 𝐴 is larger if 𝐾0 is larger, which 
brings more profit and less ∆𝐿𝑡. Thus, banks with large 𝐾0 can be said to have enough 
financial strength to maintain the ability to control inflation even at a negative shock such 
as exiting QE. 
 The budget constraints result in intertemporal changes in the balance sheet of the 
central bank. Ize (2005) developed a quantitative framework for a central bank with 
budget constraints and examined capital adjustments in some cases of distressed central 
banks. Cincibuch et al. (2009) also used a more comprehensive framework. Bindseil et 
al. (2004) used the budget constraints and Taylor rule as a behavior of the central bank 
and combined them with a simple macro-economic model to determine inflation in order 
to run some simulations. Their results revealed that the initial size of the capital of the 
central bank was important. Reis (2013a) also used the budget constraints to address the 
role of the ECB. 
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 The budget constraints are used to explore the possible outcomes of exiting QE, such 
as, presenting the detailed simulations under some scenarios for the Fed to exit QE, as 
done by Carpenter et al. (2015), Greenlaw et al. (2013), Christensen et al. (2015)3, and 
Iwata et al. (2014) estimated the BOJ’s cost under some scenarios after exiting QE, while 
Fujiki and Tomura (2017) presented results of some simulations regarding the BOJ 
exiting QE. Their results displayed variation, but none of them recorded an exploding 
monetary base in the United States or Japan. 
 
3.2. Intertemporal Budget Constraints and Solvency 
The central bank budget constraints show the time paths of capital and other items in the 
balance sheet of a central bank. Now, the question arises about the feasibility of various 
time paths, which implies finding a time path that keeps a central bank solvent while 
conducting an appropriate monetary policy.  
 Reis (2015) argued that the no-Ponzi game condition must be satisfied for solvency. 
To see this, the framework in subsection 3.1 is used. The budget constraint at each t, 
equation (3), must be satisfied for all 𝑡 ≥ 1. Both sides of equation (3) are multiplied by 
(1 + 𝑟𝐿)































−𝑡𝐿𝑡 ≤ 0, (6) 
which must be satisfied for solvency. 
 The no-Ponzi game condition is satisfied if the right-hand side of equation (5) is non-
 
3Instead of capital, these studies simulate the Fed’s “deferred asset”, which is a negative 
liability for losses. See footnote 5. 
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positive. The third term is the seigniorage, and with a negative sign, the term is non-
positive unless the bank continues to shrink the monetary base even after the exit. If 
𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿0 − 𝐶 ≥ 0, then the right-hand side is non-positive. In this case, the central bank 
can set ∆𝐻𝑡 at any non-negative value, which implies that the solvency does not restrict 
the monetary policy. If 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿0 − 𝐶 < 0, then the bank needs some seigniorage to 
keep the right-hand side non-positive. If such ∆𝐻𝑡  is larger than the appropriate 
monetary policy requirement, the solvency restricts the monetary policy and forces it to 
be inflationary. More 𝐾0 is equivalent to more 𝐴 with the same 𝐿0 , which makes 
𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿0 − 𝐶 larger, and thus the initial size of capital is an important factor for 
financial strength in this framework. 
 It depends on 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿0 − 𝐶 whether monetary policy can be restricted or not. 
This explains the non-linear relationship between financial strength and inflationary 
policy, empirical evidences of which are found in the literature discussed in subsection 
2.2.  
 Some studies combine the central bank intertemporal budget constraints with a 
macroeconomic model based on the microeconomic optimal behavior of the private sector. 
The dynamic optimization of the private sector needs the transversality condition. It states 
that the private sector does not accumulate its asset holding too fast, preventing the central 
bank liabilities from exploding, as posited by De Negro and Sims (2015, p. 5). In the 
framework of this paper, 𝐿 are the liabilities of the central bank and the assets held by 




−𝑡𝐿𝑡 = 0. (7) 
If the transversality condition (7) is satisfied, the no-Ponzi game condition (6) is satisfied. 
De Negro and Sims (2015), Benigno and Nisticò (2015) use the central bank’s 
intertemporal budget constraints and the macroeconomic model with the transversality 
condition to examine cases in which a central bank cannot conduct an appropriate 
monetary policy if it tries to stay solvent4. 
 
4 Bassetto and Messer (2013) use the intertemporal budget constraint and the 
macroeconomic model without optimal behavior of the private sector, but implicitly 
assume the no-Ponzi game condition. 
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 The no-Ponzi game condition (6) allows the value to be negative, which violates the 
transversality condition (7). In this case, the central bank can transfer 𝜏𝑡 ≥ 0 to the 
government as many central banks actually do.  
∆𝐿𝑡 = −∆𝐻𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡−1 = −∆𝐻𝑡 − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝐶 + 𝜏𝑡. (3′) 
By adjusting 𝜏𝑡, the bank can avoid a negative 𝐿. The transfer to the government is a 
topic in section 4, including the case of 𝜏𝑡 < 0 fiscal support for a central bank. 
 The losses of a central bank are covered by seigniorage, which may lead to 
inappropriate monetary policy and thus inflation. However, the bank may not be able to 
issue the monetary base enough to cover the losses unless the monetary base is sufficiently 
demanded. Buiter (2007) argued that seigniorage increases with inflation, but reaches a 
maximum and then decreases, and he calls it a seigniorage Laffer curve.  
 
3.3. Behavior to Avoid Insolvency 
The no-Ponzi game condition makes it possible to research situations in which a central 
bank cannot remain solvent if it conducts an appropriate monetary policy. The question 
that needs to be answered is how to avoid such cases. 
 Some studies analyze the precautionary actions of the central banks to avoid 
potential insolvency. Berriel and Mendes (2015) set a lower bound for the capital of a 
central bank to run the simulations. Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) included the capital, as 
well as inflation and output, in its policy objective function. Bhattarai et al. (2015) 
considered the transfer of the bank to the government as a part of its policy objective 
function, where the bank will seek to keep its profit positive in order to allow transfers, 
even though its research interest is not in solvency. 
 As it has been discussed in few studies, if a central bank is faced with insolvency, it 
must find a way to restore solvency while keeping inflation as small as possible. Benigno 
and Nisticò (2015) included a variety of numerical examples of the optimal pathways of 
the monetary base to minimize the policy objective function of inflation and output. 
Tanaka (2018, 2019) introduced a dynamic optimization model for the central bank and 
set out the optimal path to minimize the policy objective function of inflation. More 
research is needed in this area, since such optimal pathways need to be taken into account 
when designing the exit strategy for QE. 
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4. Relation with the Government 
4.1. Fiscal Transfer 
Several central banks have the provision to transfer to the government as long as the 
bank’s profit is positive and bank’s insolvency relies on this provision. Hall and Reis 
(2015) defined three forms of insolvency: period insolvency, rule insolvency, and 
intertemporal insolvency. Period insolvency refers to the rule that the government collects 
all the profit when it is positive. Under this rule, central bank insolvency is typically 
unavoidable when the profit is negative, even for one period. Rule insolvency refers to 
the rule that the government takes all the profit but defers the transfer if it is negative in 
order to allow the bank to restore solvency5. Intertemporal insolvency is based on the no-
Ponzi game condition and, in the case of a fiscal transfer, the condition corresponding to 
equation (6) can be derived from equation (3’). 
 Conversely, if the central bank receives fiscal transfers from the government, it 
allows the bank to stay solvent and to conduct an appropriate monetary policy. In the 
framework of section 3, equation (3’) shows that negative 𝜏 helps lower ∆𝐿 and ∆𝐻. 
With full support from the government, a central bank always stays solvent, as stated by 
Reis (2013b, 2015).  
 Hall and Reis (2015) looked at the solvency of the central bank in compliance with 
different rules for fiscal transfers to and from the government. Benigno and Nisticò (2015) 
have taken into account the fact that fiscal support comes from taxes and argued that it 
depends on the scale of central bank’s loss whether the fiscal support enables the bank to 
avoid inflation. Berentsen et al. (2016) concluded that the best exit strategy from QE 
depends on whether or not a central bank receives fiscal support. 
 Only a few or even none of the central banks have a definite procedure for obtaining 
fiscal transfers from the government. Establishing a rule is necessary to prevent 
insolvency, but it is also important to consider its effect on the independence of the central 
bank. Fiscal support may weaken the bank’s independence from the government, and 
Stella (1997, 2003, 2005), Bindseil et al. (2004), and Ueda (2004) were among early 
 
5 The Fed has this rule. Losses are not recorded as decrease in capital but increase in 
“deferred asset,” which is a negative liability. When it restores profitability, the Fed starts 
paying back the deferred asset to the government until the asset becomes zero. See 
Carpenter et al. (2015), subsection 2.1.5. 
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studies voicing such concern. 
 
4.2. Monetary Policy to Help the Government 
There is comprehensive literature on monetary and fiscal policy coordination, and Buiter 
(2007) addressed this in the sense of central bank solvency. Various other studies have 
looked at the prospect of alleviating government debt. Reis (2018) addressed various 
mechanisms for a central bank to alleviate government debt and concluded that its scope 
was limited. Rigon et al. (2018) provided a model showing that the central bank is facing 
a tradeoff between inflation and output stability and government debt stability. They 
found that monetary policy with debt stabilization is sub-optimal relative to policy 
without debt stabilization. 
 It is also discussed whether central banks really do or do not reduce government debt. 
Orphanides (2017, 2018) looked at the alleviation of the Fed, the BOJ, and the ECB 
following the global financial crisis. Franta et al. (2018) performed an econometric 
analysis to examine the scale of the central bank’s accommodation of debt-financed 
government spending in six developed countries. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study surveyed the literature on the capital and credibility of the central bank. 
Research in this area had evolved from the interests of developing countries to those of 
developed countries following the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. There is 
growing concern about their balance sheets as they exit QE, and this paper has looked at 
the literature in such a context. 
 Early studies addressed the need for capital for the central bank to conduct an 
appropriate monetary policy. They claimed that the central bank needs to have “financial 
strength,” and capital is an essential factor for strength. Without adequate strength, the 
central bank is vulnerable to losses and may have limited option but to follow an 
inflationary policy that jeopardizes its credibility. The empirical studies cited here provide 
evidence of a negative relationship between capital and inflation. 
 This relationship is theoretically explained by the central bank budget constraints. 
The constraints are also useful for simulating outcomes under various scenarios. 
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Simulation experiments on the Fed and the BOJ indicate that inflation is unlikely to erupt 
after exiting QE. 
 The intertemporal version of the budget constraints is extracted, leading to debates 
on central bank solvency. Some studies use it to examine whether or not a central bank 
can preserve solvency while conducting an appropriate monetary policy, but there are 
only a few to investigate optimal pathways of monetary base to restore solvency while 
keeping inflation as low as possible.  
 The solvency situation is influenced by whether a central bank has fiscal transfers to 
and from the government, and the full fiscal support keeps the central bank in position to 
remain solvent. Several studies explore the likelihood of helping to reduce government 
debt. The studies cited here are pessimistic, but the coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies is discussed in a number of articles on different issues outside the reach of this 
paper. 
 In the context of exit from QE, further research is required in the area to explore the 
optimal paths of the monetary base in the wake of insolvency. Although the above 
simulation results show no case of an eruption of inflation in the United States and Japan, 
their central banks and others are switching their course to reinforce QE in 2020, which 
is deteriorating their situation. Research in this field leads to the development of effective 
exit strategies in the future. Moreover, as fiscal support aids central banks, more 
researches are required to explore the fiscal support rule that maintains the independence 
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